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Abstract
Families of stable cyclic groups of nonlinear polynomial transformations of affine spaces 𝐾𝑛 over general commutative
ring 𝐾 of increasing with 𝑛 order can be used in the key exchange protocols and related to them El Gamal multivariate
cryptosystems. To use high degree of noncommutativity of affine Cremona group correspondents have to modify
multivariate El Gamal algorithm via the usage of conjugations for two polynomials of kind 𝑔𝑘 and 𝑔−1 given by key
holder (Alice) or giving them as elements of different transformation groups. The idea of hidden tame homomorphism and
comlexity of decomposition of polynomial transwormation into word of elements of Cremona semigroup can be used. We
suggest usage of new explicit constructions of infinite families of large stable subsemigroups of affine Cremona group of
bounded degree as instruments of multivariate key exchange protocols. Recent results on generation of families of stable
transformations of small degree and density via technique of symbolic walks on algebraic graphs are observed. Some of
them used for the implementation of schemes as above with feasible computational complexity. We consider an example
of a new implemented quadratic multivariate cryptosystem based on the above mentioned ideas.
Keywords: Multivariate Cryptography, stable transformations, modified multivariate El Gamal algorithm, desyncronisation
diagram, tame homomorphism
1. Introduction
Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) serves for the
creation and investigation of asymmetrical cryptographi-
cal algorithms which can be potentially resistant against
attacks based on the use of quantum computer. Multi-
variate cryptography is one of the oldest directions of
PQC.
It uses as security tools a nonlinear polynomial
transformations 𝑓 of kind: 𝑥1 → 𝑓1(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛),
𝑥2 → 𝑓2(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛), . . . , 𝑥𝑛 → 𝑓𝑛(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛)
acting on the affine space 𝐾𝑛 over finite commutative
ring 𝐾, where 𝑓𝑖 ∈ 𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛], 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛 are
multivariate polynomials given in a standard form, i. e.
via a list of monomials in a chosen order (see [1], [2],
[3]).
This direction started with attempts to build a secure
public keys in this form. It means the key holder Alice
has some initial data 𝐷 which allows her to solve the
equation 𝑓(x) = b, where b and x are known and
unknown elements of the free module 𝐾𝑛, but a public
user Bob has only 𝑓 given publicly in its standard
form. Asymmetry means that Alice has tools for the
encryption and decryption but Bob has only encryption
procedure.
Public knowledge on 𝑓 = 𝑓𝑛 allows adversary to
create as many pairs of kind plaintext p - ciphertext
c = 𝑓(p) as he/she wants. It makes the problem of
practical design of such a cryptosystem a difficult task.
First examples were based on families of quadratical
bijective transformation 𝑓𝑛 (see [1], [2], [3]), such choice
implies rather fast encryption process.
Various attempts to build secure multivariate public
key were unsuccessful, but the research of the develop-
ment of new candidates for secure multivariate public
keys is going on (see for instance [4] and further refer-
ences).
One of the first usage of non bijective map of multi-
variate cryptography was in oil and vinegar cryptosys-
tem analysed in [5], [6]. Nowadays this general idea is
strongly supported by publication [7] devoted to secu-
rity analysis of direct attacks on modified unbalanced
oil and vinegar systems. It looks like such systems
and rainbow signatures schemes may lead to promising
Public Key Schemes of Multivariate Encryption defined
over finite fields.
The observation of the further research on non bi-
jective multivariate cryptography a reader can find in
[8] (proceedings of the International Conference DIMA
2015 in Belarus), where the new cryptosystems with
non bijective multivariate encryption maps on the affine
space 𝑍𝑚𝑛 into itself was presented together with some
results concerning construction of bijective stable trans-
formations of large order of finite vector spaces. The
technique of [13] is based on the usage of the embed-
dings of projective geometries into corresponding Lie
algebra (see [9] and further references). Some other new
cryptosystems based on maps generated by symbolic
walks on algebraic grapha reader can find in [10], [11].
[12], [13].
The paper is devoted to other aspects of Multivariate
cryptography. Everybody knows that Diffie Hellman
key exchange protocol can be formally considered in
general case of any finite group or semigroup 𝐺. in
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case of group corresponding scheme of El Gamal cryp-
tosystem can be investigated. Notice that security of
this algorithm depends not only on abstract group 𝐺
but on the way of its generation in computer memory.
for instance if 𝐺 = 𝑍*𝑝 is multiplicative group of large
prime field then discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is
difficult one and guarantee the security of the protocol,
if same abstract group is given as additive group of
𝑍𝑝−1 protocol is insecure because DLP will be given by
linear equation. If 𝐺 is noncommutative group corre-
spondents can use conjugations of elements involved in
prototol, some algorithms of this kind were suggested in
[14], [15], [16], [17], where group 𝐺 is given with usage
generators and relations. Security of such algorithms
is connected with Conjugacy Search Problem (CSP)
and Power Conjugacy Search Problem (PCSP), which
combine CSP ? and Discrete Logarithm Problem and
their generalisations.
In papers [18], [19] we consider some modifications of
Diffie Hellman protocol when 𝐺 is given as subgroup of
affine Cremona semigroup 𝑆(𝐾𝑛) over finite commuta-
tive ring 𝐾 of all polynomial transformations. It means
that each element is given in its standard form. To use
semigroup operation one has to compute the compo-
sition of transformations. We assume that encryption
of corresponding El Gamal cryptosystem is conducted
by application of some transformation 𝐹 ∈ 𝑆(𝐾𝑛) to
plaintext (𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝑛) from 𝐾𝑛. At first glance the
idea of such Diffie Hellman protocol in affine Cremona
semigroup looks as unrealistic one because of compo-
sition of two maps of degree 𝑟 and 𝑠 taken in ”general
position ” will be a transformation of degree 𝑟𝑠. So
in majority of cases deg(𝐹 ) = 𝑑, 𝑑 ≥ 1 implies the
exponential grows of function 𝑑(𝑟) = deg(𝐹 𝑟). To guar-
antee the polynomiality of algorithm the assumption
of stability of involved transformations can be used ,
i. e. degrees of elements from cyclic group generated
by chosen element have to be bounded by independent
constant. It is a motivation of the search for stable
subgroups and semigroups of affine Cremona groups.
During last years several large stable subgroups were
discovered. These results on the explicit constructions
are observed in reprint [18] of IACR e-crypt Arxive
and paper [19] together with examples of their usage in
cryptographical algorithms. They use general technique
of generation of walks in algebraic graphs defined via
equations over finite commutative ring.
The idea of desynchronisation over diagram is used
to modify El Gamal algorithm where conjugates of
𝑔𝑘 and 𝑔−1 are elements of different factor groups is
also presented there together with some illustrating
examples. Examples of its realisation with large families
of quadratic and cubic stable transformations are given
in [18].
In current paper we going further in this direction.
We present new protocols which are not generalisations
of Diffie Hellman algorithm, their security rests on the
decomposition of element of large subsemigroup of affine
Cremona semigroup into composition of given genera-
tors. We keep requirement that all transformations are
given in their standard forms.
In section 2 basic definitions are given and concept of
tame transformation which is a generalisation of stamle
maps is discusses
In section 3 for convenience of reader we present new
general schemes of cryptographical protocols of [20]
with the usage of a concept of a tame homomorphism
of stable semigroups of affine transformations (homo-
morphic map which is computable in polynomial time).
The idea to exploit the complexity of word problem for
Cremona semigroup about the decomposition of a given
polynomial transformation 𝑔 from the semigroup into
given generators is presented in this section.
Multivariate nature of collision maps allows to use
these algorithms for safe exchange of multivariate trans-
formations. Various deformation rules can be used for
this purpose (see section 4). Correspondents may use
a family of invertible generators 𝑔𝑛. Assume that one
of them can generate inverse of 𝑔𝑛. Then the sym-
bolic El Gamal type tahoma algorithms can be used
by correspondents They can use inverse protocol to
elaborate pairs of mutually invertible transformations.
So they can conduct information exchange protected
via complexity of some difficult problem. Group en-
veloped symbolic Diffie Hellman algorithm (DHA) given
in [18] with the example of implementation of corre-
sponding El Gamal cryptosystem. This implementation
is described in section 6 in terms of symbolic chains
semigroup 𝐶ℎ(𝑛,𝐾) of sequences of polynomial trans-
formations of free module 𝐾𝑛 and its special homo-
morphisms onto quadratic stable subgroups of affine
Cremona semigroups. Such a description motivates
complexity estimates of computations by each corre-
spondent. Section 5 presents the idea of inverse group
enveloped DHA. Paper [20] is devoted to implementa-
tion of algorithm of section 3 via symbolic walks on
graphs A(n, K) (see [+17+5], [!7+6]) generating cubic
maps. In section presents 6 implementations of inverse
protocol of section 3 in terms of homomorphisms of
𝐶ℎ(𝑛,𝐾) and its quotients. New families of stable
subsemigroups of Cremona group are defined there.
2. Tame families and concept of stability
Let us consider basic algebraic objects of multivariate
cryptography, which are important for the choice of
appropriate pairs of maps 𝑓 , 𝑓−1 in both cases of public
key approach or idea of asymmetric algorithms with
protected encryption rules.
Let us consider the totality 𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) of all rules 𝑓 of
kind
𝑥1 → 𝑓1(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛), 𝑥2 → 𝑓2(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛), . . .
, 𝑥𝑛 → 𝑓𝑛(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛),
for given parameter 𝑛 and chosen commutative ring
𝐾 with natural operation of composition. We refer to
this semigroup as semigroup of formal transformation
𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) of free module 𝐾𝑛. In fact it is a totality of
all endomorphisms of ring 𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛] with the
operations of their superposition.
Each rule 𝑓 from 𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) induces transfor-
mation 𝑓 which sends tuple (𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝑛)
into (𝑓1(𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝑛), 𝑓2(𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝑛), . . . ,
Theoretical and cryptographic problems of cybersecurity
23
𝑓𝑛(𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝑛)). Affine Cremona semigroup
𝐶(𝐾𝑛) is a totality of all transformations of kind 𝑓 .
The canonical homomorphism 𝛾 : 𝑓 → 𝑓 maps infinite
semigroup 𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) onto finite semigroup 𝑆(𝐾𝑛) in the
case of finite commutative ring 𝐾.
We refer to pair (𝑓, 𝑓 ′) of elements 𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) such that
𝑓𝑓 ′ and 𝑓 ′𝑓 are two copies of identical rule 𝑥𝑖 → 𝑥𝑖,
𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛 as pair of invertible elements. If (𝑓, 𝑓 ′)
is such a pair, then product 𝑓𝑓 ′ is an identity map.
Let us consider the subgroup 𝐶𝐹𝑛(𝐾) of all invertible
elements of 𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) (group of formal maps). It means
𝑓 ∈ 𝐶𝐹𝑛(𝐾) if and only if there is 𝑓 ′ such that 𝑓𝑓 ′
and 𝑓 ′𝑓 are identity maps. It is clear that the image of
a restriction of 𝛾 on 𝐶𝐹𝑛(𝐾) is affine Cremona group
𝐶𝑛(𝐾) of all transformations of 𝐾𝑛 onto 𝐾𝑛 for which
there exists a polynomial inverse. We say that a family
of subsemigroups 𝑆𝑛 of 𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) (or 𝑆(𝐾𝑛)) is stable
of degree 𝑑 if maximal degree of elements from 𝑆𝑛 is
an independent constant 𝑑, 𝑑 > 2. If 𝐾 is a finite
commutative ring then stable semigroup has to be a
finite set. The brief observation of known families of
stable groups can be found in [20] (see also [23], [24],
[25], [26], [ 27]).
Let 𝑓𝑛 ∈ 𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) be a family of nonlinear maps of
degree bounded by constant 𝑑. We say that 𝑓𝑛 form
tame family if there is a family 𝑔𝑛 ∈ 𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) of degree
bounded by constant 𝑑′ such that 𝑓𝑛𝑔𝑛 = 𝑔𝑛𝑓𝑛 are
identity maps. Let 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 be two elements from the
group 𝐴𝐺𝐿𝑛(𝐾) of all affine bijective transformations,
i. e. elements of affine Cremona group of degree 1.
Then we refer to 𝑓 ′𝑛 = 𝜏1𝑓𝑛𝜏2 as linear deformation of
𝑓𝑛. Obviously 𝑓 ′𝑛 is also tame family of transformations,
degrees of maps from this family is also bounded by 𝑑.
The degrees of inverses of 𝑓 ′𝑛 are bounded by 𝑑′.
Let 𝐺𝑛 < 𝐹𝑆𝑛(𝐾) be a stable family of subgroups
of degree 𝑑, 𝑑 ≥ 2, then nonlinear representatives 𝑓𝑛 of
𝐺𝑛 form tame family of maps.
3. On the concept of tame homomorphism and
related algorithms
Let 𝐺 = 𝐺𝑛 be a family of stable subsemigroups of
𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) (or 𝑆(𝐾𝑛)) and 𝐿 = 𝐿𝑚, where 𝑚 depends
on 𝑛, be a family of stable subsemigroups of 𝑆𝐹𝑚(𝑅)
(or 𝑆(𝑅𝑚)), where 𝐾 and 𝑅 are commutative rings.
There are tame homomorphism 𝜙 = 𝜙𝑛 from 𝐺 into
𝐿, i. e. value of 𝜙 in each point 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝑛 is computable
in polynomial time from 𝑛. Let us assume, that there
are semigroups 𝐵 = 𝐵𝑛 < 𝐺𝑛 given by its generators
𝑏1, 𝑏2, . . . , 𝑏𝑟. Let us assume that Alice has families
of tame transformations 𝜋1 of 𝐾𝑛 and 𝜋2 of 𝑅𝑚. We
assume that these data is known to Alice. She forms
(𝑎𝑖 = 𝜋1𝑏𝑖𝜋1−1, 𝑎′𝑖 = 𝜋2𝜙(𝑏𝑖)𝜋2−1), 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑟 and
sends them to Bob.
The elements of these pairs are given in their standard
forms from 𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) or 𝑆𝐹𝑚(𝑅).
PROTOCOL. The list of pairs known for Bob defines
homomorphism ∆ between 𝐴 =< 𝑎1, 𝑎2, . . . , 𝑎𝑟 > and
𝐴 =< 𝑎′1, 𝑎
′
2, . . . , 𝑎
′
𝑟 > given by its values on generators.
Bob forms 𝑎 via his choice of word 𝑎𝑖1𝑘1𝑎𝑖2𝑘2 . . . 𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑡
in the alphabet of generators of 𝐴 such that 𝑎𝑖𝑠 ̸= 𝑎𝑖𝑠+1
for 𝑠 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑡− 1. He sends 𝑎 = 𝑎𝑖1𝑘1𝑎𝑖2𝑘2 . . . 𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑡
to Alice and keeps ∆(𝑎) = 𝑎′ = 𝑎′𝑖1
𝑘1𝑎′𝑖2
𝑘2 . . . 𝑎′𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑡 as
collision element.
Alice knows tame homomorphism 𝜙 and easily com-
putes 𝑎′ as 𝜋2𝜙(𝜋1−1𝑎𝜋1)𝜋2−1.
COMPLEXITY REMARK. Adversary has to solve
word problem for subsemigroup 𝐴, i. e. find decompo-
sition of 𝑎𝐴 into generators 𝑎𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑡. General
algorithm to solve this problem in polynomial time in
variable 𝑛 is unknown as well as a procedure to get its
solution in terms of quantum computations.
REMARK 1. The condition of stability for semi-
groups 𝐺 and 𝐿 and the usage of tame transformations
𝜋1 and 𝜋2 allow us to estimate degrees of 𝑎 and collision
map.
If maximal degrees of 𝜋1(𝑛) and 𝜋1−1(𝑛) are 𝑙1 and
𝑙′1, degrees of 𝜋1(𝑛) and 𝜋1−1(𝑛) are bounded by 𝑙2 and
𝑙′2 and stable groups 𝐺 and 𝐿 are of degrees 𝑑 and 𝑑′





REMARK 2. One can use other natural conditions
on 𝜋1 and 𝜋2. Let us assume that 𝐺 < 𝐺1 and 𝐿 <
𝐺2, where 𝐺𝑖 are stable families of subsemigroups of
degree 𝑡1, 𝑡1 ≥ 𝑑 and 𝑡2, 𝑡2 ≥ 𝑑′ respectively. Let us
consider normalisers 𝑁1 and 𝑁2 of 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 in affine
Cremona semigroups 𝑆(𝐾𝑛) and 𝑆(𝑅𝑚). it means
that 𝑁1 = {𝜋 ∈ 𝐶(𝐾𝑛)|𝜋𝐺1𝜋−1 < 𝐺1} and 𝑁2 =
{𝜋 ∈ 𝐶(𝑅𝑚)|𝜋𝐺2𝜋−1 < 𝐺2}. We can take 𝜋1 of kind
𝜏1𝑛1 and 𝜋2 of kind 𝜏2𝑛2, where 𝑛𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2,
𝜏1 ∈ 𝐴𝐺𝐿𝑛(𝐾) and 𝜏2 ∈ 𝐴𝐺𝐿𝑚(𝑅). Then degrees of
𝑎 and ∆(𝑎) are restricted by 𝑡1 and 𝑡2.
Notice that in the case 𝐺 = 𝐺1, 𝐿 = 𝐺2 degrees of 𝑎
and ∆(𝑎) are bounded by 𝑑 and 𝑑′.
We refer to presented above algorithm as tahoma word
protocol. Termin tahoma (name of shrift for word pro-
cessing) stands for combination tame homomorphism.
The protocol exploits the complexity of the world
problem for a semigroup of polynomial transformation
of free module.
In the case considered in REMARK 2 we use termin
stable tahoma word protocol.
INVERSE TAHOMA WORD PROTOCOL.
Let us modify above PROTOCOL in the case of in-
vertible elements 𝜙(𝑏𝑖) with an assumption that 𝜙(𝑏𝑖)
−1
are known to Alice.




−1, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑟. Assume
Bob gets from Alice the list of such pairs. Notice
that 𝐴′ is a group < ?̃?𝑖|𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑟 >. So Bob is able
to compute antisomorphism 𝜎 sending 𝑧 from 𝐴 into
∆(𝑏)−1 because he knows its values on generators ?̃?𝑖.
Like in previous protocol Bob forms 𝑎 via his choice
of word 𝑎𝑖1𝑘1𝑎𝑖2𝑘2 . . . 𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑡 in the alphabet of generators
of 𝐴 such that 𝑎𝑖𝑠 ̸= 𝑎𝑖𝑠+1 for 𝑠 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑡 − 1 and
sends 𝑎 = 𝑎𝑖1𝑘1𝑎𝑖2𝑘2 . . . 𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑡 to Alice.
Now he keeps 𝜎(𝑎) = 𝑎′ = ?̃?𝑘𝑡𝑖𝑡 ?̃?
𝑘𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1
. . . ?̃?𝑘1𝑖1 as collision
element.
Alice computes 𝑒 = 𝑎′−1 as 𝜋2𝜙(𝜋1−1𝑎𝜋1)𝜋2−1.
INVERSE TAHOMA WORD CRYPTOSYSTEM.
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Both above protocols exploit the complexity of finding
decomposition of 𝑎 into product of given generating
transformations.
Alice and Bob can communicate because of they have
mutually inverse transformations 𝑒 and 𝑎′. Alice writes
her message p and sends 𝑒(p) to Bob, who decrypts via
usage of 𝑎′. Bob can encrypt with 𝑎′ and Alice decrypts
with 𝑒.
REMARK. In the case when transformation 𝑒 =
𝑒𝑚 of free module 𝑅𝑚 form stable family of degree
𝑑′ adversary has to intercept 𝑂(𝑚𝑑
′
) messages and
conduct costly linearisation attack to restore 𝑒 and
𝑎′. So correspondents can safely exchange 𝑂(𝑚𝑑
′−1)
messages. Notice that any moment Alice and Bob can
start a new session of inverse tahoma word protocol.
Different usage of homomorphisms of subsemigroup
of Cremona semigrouup in the cryptosystem was con-
sidered in [28], [29].
4. On safe exchange of symbolic transforma-
tions
The symbolic nature of collision map can be used for
task that differs from exchange of keys. We refer to it
as the usage of DH deformed symbolic rules.
Let Alice have a free module 𝐾𝑛 over commutative
ring 𝐾. She has a subset Ω of 𝐾𝑛 and polynomial map
𝑓 : 𝐾𝑛 → 𝐾𝑛 such the restriction of 𝑓 |Ω is an injective
map from Ω onto 𝑓(Ω) = Γ. Additionally Alice has an
algorithm to solve in polynomial time equation 𝑓(x) = b
with respect to unknown x from Ω and b ∈ Γ.
Alice and Bob use tahoma word protocol or symbolic
Diffie-Hellman protocol to elaborate the collision map
𝑔 acting on 𝐾𝑛.
After this step Alice sends Ω and transformation
ℎ = 𝑓 + 𝑔 to Bob.
Now Bob can get 𝑓 as ℎ − 𝑔. He writes plaintext
p ∈ Ω and sends ciphertext c = 𝑓(x). Alice uses her
data for the decryption.
REMARK. Notice that new algorithm is still asym-
metrical because Bob can encrypt but not decrypt. The
encryption rule is known to trusted customer (Bob) but
adversary has no access to it. In fact such access is pro-
tected by word problem in semigroup of transformations
of 𝐾𝑁 or discrete logarithm problem in corresponding
affine Cremona semigroup.
OTHER DEFORMATIONS.
Alice and Bob agree (via open channel) on a defor-
mation rule 𝐷(𝑓) for multivatiate rule 𝑓 from affine
Cremona semigroup. For example, it can be multipli-
cation, i.e. 𝑓 is the rule 𝑥𝑖 → 𝑓𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛, 𝑔 is
the rule 𝑥𝑖 → 𝑔𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛 and Alice sends tuple
of polynomials 𝑓𝑖𝑔𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛. Bob uses division
to restore 𝑓 .
Instead of addition deformation rule (sending of 𝑥𝑖 →
𝑓𝑖(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛) + 𝑔𝑖(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛), 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛)
Alice can use deformation with adding an element
𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛]
𝑛 obtained from 𝑔 via the usage of
𝑠-time conducted derivation 𝛿(𝑠), where 𝛿 = d/d𝑥1 +
d/d𝑥2 + · · · + d/d𝑥𝑛 (rule 𝑥𝑖 → 𝑓𝑖(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛) +
𝛿(𝑠)𝑔𝑖(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛), 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛). The last defor-
mation is interesting because in many cases we can
achieve the equality of degrees for 𝑓 and 𝐷(𝑓). It is
easy to continue this list of possible deformation rules.
REMARK. Let us assume that Ω = 𝐾𝑛. So 𝑓 =
𝑓𝑛 is a bijection. Assume that degrees of nonlinear
maps 𝑓𝑛 are bounded by constant 𝑑. Let us assume
that the adversary has option to intercept some pairs
plaintext - ciphertext (leakage from Bob’s data). In
case of interseption of 𝑂(𝑛𝑑) adversary has chance for
a successful linearisation attack and get the map 𝑓 . For
example if 𝑑 = 3 then linearisation attack cost is 𝑂(𝑛10).
After that adversary has to find the inverse function 𝑓−1
like in the case of multivariate public key. To prevent
”transition to knowledge” of an encryption multivariate
map Alice (or Bob) can arrange a new session with
protocol and a transmission of new deformed encryption
rule for which secret data for decryption is known.
REMARK. The technique of linearisation attacks on
nonbijective maps or maps 𝑓𝑛 of unbounded degree and
low density is not developed yet.
5. On the inverse version of the group en-
veloped symbolic Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change protocol
Let 𝐺 = 𝐺𝑛 be a family of stable subsemigroups of
𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) (or 𝑆(𝐾𝑛)) and 𝐿 = 𝐿𝑚, where 𝑚 depends
on 𝑛, be a family of stable subsemigroups of 𝑆𝐹𝑚(𝑅)
(or 𝑆(𝑅𝑚)), where 𝐾 and 𝑅 are commutative rings.
There are tame homomorphism 𝜙 = 𝜙𝑛 from 𝐺 into
𝐿, i. e. value of 𝜙 in each point 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝑛 is computable
in polynomial time from 𝑛. Let us assume, that there
are subgroups 𝐴 = 𝐴𝑚 < 𝐿𝑚 and 𝐵 = 𝐵𝑛 < 𝐺𝑛 such
that 𝜙(𝑏)𝑎 = 𝑎𝜙(𝑏) for all pairs 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵. Assume
that two families of tame transformations 𝜋 = 𝜋(𝑛) and
𝜇 = 𝜇(𝑚) are chosen.
We assume that these data is known to Alice. She




−1)𝜇−1), 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑟, where
elements 𝑏𝑖 ∈ 𝐵𝑛, there inverses and images are given
in their standard forms from 𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) or 𝑆𝐹𝑚(𝑅) and
sends them to Bob. Let 𝛿 be a homomorphismm from
< 𝑐1, 𝑐2, . . . , 𝑐𝑟 > to < 𝑑1, 𝑑2, . . . , 𝑑𝑟 > sending 𝑐𝑖 to 𝑑𝑖.
We present briefly the protocol of symbolic computa-
tions introduced in [18] and define its inverse version.
We refer to this protocols as group enveloped Diffie-
Hellman scheme and inversive group enveloped Diffie -
Hellman scheme.
PROTOCOL 1. Alice takes positive integer 𝑘𝐴, and
𝑎, 𝑎−1 from 𝐴𝑚 and 𝑔′ from the semigroup 𝐺. She
computes 𝑔𝐴 = 𝜇 (𝑎𝜙(𝑔′)𝑎−1 ) 𝜇−1 and sends to Bob
𝑔 =′ 𝜋−1 together with 𝑔𝐴.
Bob chooses positive integer 𝑘𝐵 and element 𝑐 ∈<
𝑐1, 𝑐2, . . . , 𝑐𝑟 > (via the choice of word in alphabet
{𝑐1, 𝑐2, . . . , 𝑐𝑟}). He computes 𝑔𝐵 = 𝑐𝑔𝑘𝐵𝑐−1 in stan-
dard form of 𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) and sends it to Alice. Bob com-
putes a map 𝛿(𝑐)𝑔𝐴𝑘𝐵𝛿(𝑐−1) because he knows the de-
composition of 𝑐 and 𝑐−1 into their generators and keeps
it as the collision map.
Alice computes the collision map as
𝜇𝑎𝜙(𝜋−1𝑔𝐵
𝑘𝐴𝜋)𝑎−1𝜇−1.
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REMARK. Adversary has to consider group 𝐶 ′ =<
𝑐𝑖|𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑟 > and solve GROUP ENVELOPED
DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM, i. e. solve
𝑦𝑔𝑥𝑦−1 = 𝑔𝐵 where 𝑥 is unknown integer parameter and
𝑦 ∈ 𝐶 ′. Natural possibility is to solve decomposition
problem of 𝑔𝐵 into semigroup generators 𝑐1, 𝑐2, . . . , 𝑐𝑟, 𝑔
(word problem in affine Cremona semigroup).
INVERSE PROTOCOL. Let us assume that Alice
can generate 𝑔′ such that 𝜙(𝑔′) is invertible and the
inverse 𝜙(𝑔′)−1 is computable for her.
As in previous algorithm Alice takes positive inte-
ger 𝑘𝐴, and element 𝑎, 𝑎−1 from 𝐴𝑚 and 𝑔′ from the
semigroup 𝐺. Now she computes 𝑧 = 𝜙(𝑔′)−1 and
𝑔𝐴 = 𝜇𝑎𝑧𝑎
−1𝜇−1 and sends to Bob 𝑔 = 𝜋𝑔′𝜋−1 to-
gether with 𝑔𝐴.
As in previous algorithm Bob chooses positive in-
teger 𝑘𝐵 and element 𝑐 ∈< 𝑐1, 𝑐2, . . . , 𝑐𝑟 > (via the
choice of word in alphabet {𝑐1, 𝑐2, . . . , 𝑐𝑟}. He computes
𝑔𝐵 = 𝑐𝑔
𝑘𝐵𝑐−1 in standard form of 𝑆𝐹𝑛(𝐾) and sends
it to Alice. Bob computes a map 𝑒 = 𝛿(𝑐)𝑔𝐴𝑘𝐵𝛿(𝑐−1)
because he knows the decomposition of 𝑐 and 𝑐−1 into
their generators and keeps it as his a result of a collision.
Alice computes the map 𝑒−1 as
𝜇𝑎𝜙(𝜋−1𝑔𝐵
𝑘𝐴𝜋)𝑎−1𝜇−1.
INVERSE GROUP ENVELOBED DH CRYP-
TOSYSTEM.
Alice and Bob can communicate because of they have
mutually inverse transformations 𝑒−1 and 𝑒.
1) Alice writes her message p and sends 𝑒−1(p) to
Bob, who decrypts via usage of 𝑒.
2) Bob can encrypt with 𝑒 and Alice decrypts with
𝑒−1.
The algorithm (2) was introduced in [18] as desyn-
chronised symbolic El Gamal Algorithm.
6. Semigroup Ech(𝐾, 𝑘), its special quotients
and cryptographical applications
Let 𝐾 be a commutative ring and 𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘, 𝑘 ≥
2 be the list of variables. We consider the totality
Ch(𝐾, 𝑘) of chains (𝑃 1, 𝑃 2, . . . , 𝑃 𝑠) of length 𝑠, 𝑠 ≥ 𝑂
where 𝑃 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘]𝑘.
Each 𝐹 = (𝐹1, 𝐹2, . . . , 𝐹𝑘) ∈ 𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘]𝑘 in-
duces the map 𝐹 of 𝐾𝑘 into 𝐾𝑘 given by rule 𝑥𝑖 →
𝐹𝑖(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘), 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑘.
The natural product of 𝑃 and ?̃? is the map 𝐹
for 𝐹 = (𝐹1, 𝐹2, . . . , 𝐹𝑘) ∈ 𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘]𝑘 with 𝐹𝑖 =
(𝑄𝑖(𝑃1(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘), 𝑃2(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘), . . . , 𝑃𝑘(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘)),
𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑘. We simply write 𝑃 ×𝑄 = 𝐹 .
We define chain composition of symbolic chains
(𝑃 1, 𝑃 2, . . . , 𝑃 𝑠) and (𝑄1, 𝑄2, . . . , 𝑄𝑙) as a sequence
(𝑃 1, 𝑃 2, . . . , 𝑃 𝑠, 𝑃 𝑠 ×𝑄1, 𝑃 𝑠 ×𝑄2, . . . , 𝑃 𝑠 ×𝑄𝑙).
LEMMA 1.
Chain composition defines a semigroup Ch(𝐾, 𝑘).
An empty chain is a unity of this infinite semigroup.
We consider subsemigroup Ech(𝐾, 𝑘) of chains of even
length.
Let 𝑆(𝐾𝑛) be a Cremona semigroup of all transforma-
tion of free module 𝐾𝑛 of kind 𝑥𝑖 → 𝐹𝑖(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛),
𝐹𝑖 ∈ 𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑛], 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑛. In [Usti-
menko, E-crypt] a special map 𝜇 from Ech(𝐾, 𝑘) into
𝑆(𝐾(𝑘+1)𝑘) was defined in terms of algebraic graphs.
The definition is following.
We define Double Schubert Graph 𝐷𝑆(𝑘,𝐾) over
commutative ring 𝐾 as incidence structure defined as
disjoint union of points from
𝑃𝑆 = {(x) = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘, 𝑥1,1, 𝑥1,2, . . . 𝑥𝑘,𝑘)| ∈
(x) ∈ 𝐾(𝑘+1)𝑘} and lines from 𝐿𝑆 = {[y] =
[𝑦1, 𝑦2, . . . , 𝑦𝑘, 𝑦1,1, 𝑦1,2, . . . 𝑦𝑘,𝑘]| ∈ (y) ∈ 𝐾(𝑘+1)𝑘}
where (x) is incident to [y] if and only if 𝑥𝑖,𝑗−𝑦𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑗
for 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑘, 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑘. It is convenient to
assume that indexes of kind 𝑖, 𝑗 are placed in lexico-
graphical order.
REMARK. The term Double Schubert Graphs is
chosen because points and lines of 𝐷𝑆(𝑘, 𝐹𝑞) can be
treated as subspaces of 𝐹𝑞2𝑘+1 of dimensions 𝑘 + 1 and
𝑘 which form two largest Schubert cells. Recall that
the largest Schubert cell is the largest orbit of group of
unitriangular matrices acting on the variety of subsets
of given dimensions. (see [8] and further references).
We define the colour of point (x) =
(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘, 𝑥1,1, 𝑥1,2, . . . 𝑥𝑘,𝑘) from 𝑃𝑆 as
tuple (𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘) and the colour of line
[y] = [𝑦1, 𝑦2, . . . , 𝑦𝑘, 𝑦1,1, 𝑦1,2, . . . 𝑦𝑘,𝑘] as tuple
(𝑦1, 𝑦2, . . . , 𝑦𝑘). For each vertex v of 𝐷𝑆(𝑘,𝐾)
there is a unique neighbour 𝑁𝛼(v) of given colour
𝛼 = (𝑎1, 𝑎2, . . . , 𝑎𝑘), 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑘.
The symbolic colour 𝐺 from 𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘]𝑘
of kind 𝐺1(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘), 𝐺2(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑧𝑘), . . . ,
𝐺𝑘(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘), where 𝐺𝑖 are polynomials from
𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘] defines the neighbouring line of
symbolic point (x) = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘, 𝑥1,1, 𝑥1,2, . . . 𝑥𝑘,𝑘)
(coordinates are variables) with colour
(𝐺1(𝑥1, 𝑥2, , . . . , 𝑥𝑘), 𝐺2(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘), . . . ,
𝐺𝑘(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘)) in the graph
𝐷𝑆(𝑘,𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘]). Similarly we define a
neighbour if symbolic line.
Let us consider a tuple of symbolic colours
(𝐺1, 𝐺2, . . . , 𝐺2𝑡) ∈ 𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘]𝑘 and the map 𝐹
of 𝑃𝑆 to itself which sends the point (x) to the end v2𝑡
of the chain v0, v1, . . . , v2𝑡, where (x) = v0, v𝑖𝐼v𝑖+1,
𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 2𝑡 − 1 and 𝜌(v𝑗) = 𝐺𝑗(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘),
𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 2𝑡. We refer to 𝐹 as closed point to point
computation with the symbolic key (𝐺1, 𝐺2, . . . , 𝐺2𝑡).
As it follows from definitions 𝐹 = 𝐹𝐺1,𝐺2,...,𝐺2𝑡 is a
multivariate map of 𝐾𝑘(𝑘+1) to itself. When symbolic
key is given 𝐹 can be computed in a standard form via
elementary operations of addition subtraction and multi-
plication of the ring 𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘, 𝑥11, 𝑥12, . . . , 𝑥𝑘𝑘].
Recall that (𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘, 𝑥11, 𝑥12, . . . , 𝑥𝑘𝑘) is our sym-
bolic point of the graph.
Symbolic key 𝐺 = (𝐺1, 𝐺2, . . . , 𝐺2𝑡) is an element
of semigroup 𝐸𝑐ℎ(𝑘,𝐾). We define 𝜇(𝐺) as 𝐹 =
𝐹𝐺1,𝐺2,...,𝐺2𝑡 . The following statements are instant
corollaries from the definition of homomorphism.
In fact the idea to use algebraic graphs with special
colours (linguistic graphs) and walks of them in cryp-
tography was proposed in [30]. Some of its applications
reader can find in [31].
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The map 𝜇 = 𝜇𝑘 is a homomorphism of 𝐸𝑐ℎ(𝑘,𝐾)
into 𝑆(𝐾(𝑘+1)𝑘).
LEMMA 2
An element 𝜇(𝐶) for 𝐶 = (𝑃 1, 𝑃 2, . . . , 𝑃 2𝑚) is a
bijection iff the map 𝑃 2𝑚 is one to one correspondence.
LEMMA 3
If 𝐹 is the inverse map for ˜𝑃 2𝑚 in 𝑆(𝐾𝑘) then for 𝐶 ′
given by tuple (𝐹 × 𝑃 2𝑚−1, 𝐹 × 𝑃 2𝑚−2, . . . , 𝐹 × 𝑃 1, 𝐹 )
the transformation 𝜇(𝐶 × 𝐶 ′) is an identity map.
We refer to 𝐶 ′ as reverse chain.
Let 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑘,𝐾) be a totality of symbolic chains of kind
𝐶 = (𝑃 1, 𝑃 2, . . . , 𝑃 2𝑡) where the degrees of polynomials
from the tuple 𝑃 2𝑡 are equal 1, i. e. its affine map. We
will use 𝑃 0 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘). Notice that deg(𝑃 0) =
deg(𝑃 2𝑡) = 1. Totality 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑘,𝐾) is a subsemigroup
in 𝐸𝑐ℎ(𝑘,𝐾)
We define deg(𝐶) as maximum of deg(𝑃 0) +
deg(𝑃 1), deg(𝑃 1) + deg(𝑃 2), deg(𝑃 2) + deg(𝑃 3), . . . ,
deg(𝑃 2𝑡−1) + deg(𝑃 2𝑡).
THEOREM 2
For each 𝐶 from 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑘,𝐾) the equality deg(𝜇(𝐶)) =
deg(𝐶) holds.
Proof
Let us assume that 𝐶 = (𝐺1, 𝐺2, . . . , 𝐺2𝑡) with 𝐺𝑖 =
(ℎ1
𝑖, ℎ2
𝑖, . . . , ℎ𝑘
𝑖), 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 2𝑡 is the symbolic key
of the closed point to point computation 𝐹 = 𝐹 (𝑘)
of the symbolic automaton 𝐷𝑆(𝑘,𝐾). We set that
𝑔0 = (ℎ1
0, ℎ2
0, . . . , ℎ𝑘
0) = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘).
Then 𝐹 = 𝜇(𝐶) is a transformation of kind
𝑥1 → 𝐺12𝑡(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘), 𝑥2 →
𝐺2
2𝑡(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘), . . . , 𝑥𝑘 → 𝐺𝑘2𝑡(𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘))
𝑥11 → 𝑥11 −𝐺11𝑥1 +𝐺11𝐺12 −𝐺13𝐺12 + ℎ13𝐺14 +
· · ·+𝐺12𝑡−1𝐺12𝑡
𝑥12 → 𝑥12 −𝐺11𝑥2 +𝐺11𝐺22 −𝐺13𝐺22 +𝐺13𝐺14 +
· · ·+𝐺22𝑡−1𝐺12𝑡.
. . .
𝑥𝑘𝑘 → 𝑥𝑘𝑘 −𝐺𝑘1𝑥𝑘 +𝐺𝑘1𝐺𝑘2−𝐺𝑘3𝐺𝑘2+𝐺𝑘3𝐺𝑘4+
· · ·+𝐺𝑘2𝑡−1𝐺𝑘2𝑡
The statement follows from the above written closed
form of the map.
We consider the totality 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(𝑘,𝐾) of all chains
from 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑘,𝐾) of degree ≤ 𝑑, 𝑑 ≥ 2. This subset is
closed under the operation ×.
LEMMA 4.
Subsemigroup 𝑆(𝑑, 𝑘) = 𝜇(𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(𝑘,𝐾)) is a stable
subsemigroup of 𝑆(𝐾𝑘(𝑘+1)) of degree 𝑑, i. e. the degree
of each element of 𝑆(𝑑, 𝑘)) is ≤ 𝑑.
This statement is a direct corollary from Theorem 2.
We implement algorithm of computation of elements
from semigroup 𝑆(𝑑, 𝑘). And use this program in case of
𝑆(2, 𝑘) and various comutative rings for the implemen-
tation of the key exchange protocols and cryptosystems
of multivariate cryptography.
We consider subsemigroup 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(𝑟, 𝑘,𝐾), 1 ≤
𝑟 ≤ 𝑘 of 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(𝑘,𝐾) consisting of chains of kind
(𝐹 1, 𝐹 2, . . . , 𝐹 𝑡) such that 𝐹 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑟] for
𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑟 and arbitrary 𝑖.
LEMMA 5.
There is a canonical homomorphism 𝜎𝑟 of
𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(𝑟, 𝑘,𝐾) onto 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(𝑟,𝐾) sending
(𝐹 1, 𝐹 2, . . . , 𝐹 𝑡) into (𝐺1, 𝐺2, . . . , 𝐺𝑡), where 𝐺𝑖
is a projection of 𝐹 𝑖 onto its first 𝑟 coordinates.
LEMMA 6.
Let 𝜂 be natural embedding of 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(𝑟, 𝑘,𝐾)
into 𝐸𝑐ℎ(𝑑)(𝑘,𝐾). Then there is a ho-
momorphism 𝜙 of 𝑆(𝑑, 𝑘) onto 𝑆(𝑑, 𝑟)
such that 𝜙(𝑚𝑢𝑘(𝜂(𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(𝑟, 𝑘,𝐾))) =
𝜇𝑟(𝜎𝑟(𝐸𝑐ℎ
′(𝑑)(𝑟, 𝑘,𝐾)).
Let 𝑒1, 𝑒2, . . . , 𝑒𝑘, 𝑒11, 𝑒1,2, . . . , 𝑒𝑘,𝑘 be natural basis
in which graph 𝐷𝑆(𝑘,𝐾) is defined. For each sym-
bolic walk 𝐺 transformation 𝜇(𝐺) preserves affine space
𝑊 spanned by 𝑒1, 𝑒2, . . . , 𝑒𝑟 and 𝑒𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑟,
𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑟, The homomorphism 𝜙 = 𝜙𝑟 is simply
restriction of 𝜇(𝐺) onto 𝑊 .
LEMMA 7.
Let degree of chain 𝐶 from 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑘,𝐾) is 𝑑. Then
𝜇(𝐶) can be computed in time 𝑂(𝑘2+2𝑑).
LEMMA 8.
Let 𝑑 be the degree of chain 𝐶 from 𝜇(𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑟, 𝑘,𝐾)).
Then the value of 𝜙 in point 𝐶 can be computed in time
of 𝑂(𝑘𝑑+2).
IMPLEMENTED ALGORITHM.
Alice selects commutative ring 𝐾 and parameters
𝑘 and 𝑟 and symbolic chain 𝐺 of even length from
𝐸𝑐ℎ′(2)(𝑟, 𝑘,𝐾) of kind (𝐺1, 𝐺2, . . . , 𝐺𝑡) such that
𝑥1 → 𝐺𝑡1, 𝑥2 → 𝐺𝑡2, . . . , 𝑥𝑟 → 𝐺𝑡𝑟 is an invert-
ible linear map of increasing with 𝑟 order 𝑑(𝑟) (one can
take a Singer cycle of order 𝑞𝑟 − 1 in case of 𝐾 = 𝐹𝑞).
So subsemigroup generated by 𝑔 has cardinality ≥ 𝑑(𝑟).
Alice takes invertible chains 𝐶1, 𝐶2, . . . , 𝐶𝑚 from
𝐸𝑐ℎ′(2)(𝑟, 𝑘,𝐾) together with their reverse chains 𝐶 ′𝑗 ,
𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . ,𝑚.
She takes invertible computations 𝐶 in 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(2)(𝑘,𝐾)
and 𝐷 in 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(2)(𝑟,𝐾) together with their reverses
𝐶 ′ and 𝐷′. Alice takes elements 𝑋, 𝑋−1 from
𝐴𝐺𝐿𝑘(𝑘+1)(𝐾) and 𝑌, 𝑌 −1 from 𝐴𝐺𝐿𝑟(𝑟+1)(𝐾).
She computes pairs 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑌 𝜇𝑟(𝐷𝜎𝑟(𝐶𝑖)𝐷′)𝑌 −1,
𝑎𝑖










Alice forms 𝑢 = 𝑋𝜇𝑘(𝐶𝐺𝐶 ′)𝑋−1 and 𝑣 =
𝑌 𝜇𝑟(𝐷𝜎𝑟(𝐺
′)𝐷′)𝑌 −1.
She takes integer 𝑘𝐴 > 0 and starts correspondence
with Bob. Alice sends 𝑤 = 𝑣𝑘𝐴 to Bob together with
pairs 𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑖−1 and 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖−1, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . ,𝑚 and element
𝑢.
Bob takes integer parameters 𝑘𝐵 and 𝑟𝑖1 , 𝑟𝑖2 , . . . , 𝑟𝑖𝑠 .
He forms word 𝑏 as 𝑎𝑖1𝑟𝑖1𝑎𝑖2𝑟𝑖2 . . . 𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑤𝑘𝐵
𝑎𝑖𝑠
−𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑖𝑠−1
−𝑟𝑖𝑠−1 . . . 𝑎𝑖1
−𝑟𝑖1 .
Bob creates the plaintext p from 𝐾𝑟(𝑟+1). He sends
ciphertext c = 𝑏(p) together with
𝑧 = 𝑏𝑖1
𝑟𝑖1 𝑏𝑖2




. . . 𝑏𝑖1
−𝑟𝑖1 .
DECRYPTION. Alice computes 𝑧1 =
𝜇𝑘(𝐶




′)𝑌 −1 and gets p as 𝑧2(c).
REMARK. Adversary has to find a decomposi-
tion of nonbijective transformation 𝑧 into generators
𝑏1, 𝑏2, . . . , 𝑏𝑚 and 𝑢. He/she has find also an inverse
Theoretical and cryptographic problems of cybersecurity
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for 𝑣. Knowledge about 𝑖1, 𝑖2, . . . 𝑖𝑠 and 𝑟𝑖1 , 𝑟𝑖2 , . . . 𝑟𝑖𝑠
and 𝑘𝐵 allows he/she to form 𝑧.
Let us consider a complexity estimates in case of
constant integers 𝑚, 𝑘𝐴, 𝑘𝐵 , 𝑟𝑖1 , 𝑟𝑖2 , . . . , 𝑟𝑖𝑠 , symbolic
chains of constant length and multivariate polynomials
of degree 1. We assume additionally that 𝑟 is linear
expression from 𝑘.
So Alice can generate chains 𝐺,𝐶1, 𝐶2, . . . , 𝐶𝑚 and
their images under 𝜎𝑟 in time 𝑂(𝑘2). She is able
to compute their reverses for 𝑂(𝑘3). Really if 𝐹 =
(𝐹 1, 𝐹 2, . . . , 𝐹 𝑡) ∈ 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(2)(𝑘,𝐾) and 𝐹 𝑡
−1
is known
map. To form 𝐹 ′ Alice need 𝑘 − 1 matrix multiplica-
tions. It requires time 𝑂(𝑘4). It is easy to see that
computation of 𝜎𝑟(𝐺′)
𝑘𝐴 also requires 𝑂(𝑘4) elementary
operations.
Alice needs to compute images of 𝜇 for several el-
ements of 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑘,𝐾) and 𝐸𝑐ℎ′(𝑟,𝐾) of degree 2. It
costs her 𝑂(𝑘4) elementary operations. Additionally
she computes composition of linear map and quadratic
map of density 0(𝑘2) from 𝑘(𝑘+1) variables. Alice can
do this in 𝑂 (𝑘8) in assumption then pairs 𝑋, 𝑋−1 and
𝑌 , 𝑌 −1 are already created. Finally Alice has compute
a composition of quadratic and linear map in 𝑘(𝑘 + 1)
variables. It also takes 𝑂(𝑘8) operations. It means that
Alice can prepare all data to start algorithm In time
𝑂(𝑘8).
Let us estimate the complexity of computations for
Bob.
He need to create two words of finite lengths in corre-
sponding affine Cremona semigroup via several compo-
sitions of quadratic polynomials in 𝑘(𝑘+1) variables. It
takes him 𝑂(𝑘14) elementary ring operations. Compu-
tation of quadratic map in given point of 𝐾𝑘(𝑘+1) takes
time 𝑂(𝑘6). Thus the total complexity of computations
for Bob is 𝑂(𝑘14). Let us estimate the complexity of
decryption proces for Alice. She need computation
of product of linear and quadratic maps, product of
two quadratic maps of densities 𝑘2 and 𝑘4, product of
two quadratic maps of densities 𝑘4 and 𝑘2. It requires
𝑂(𝑘12) operations.
OTHER OPTIONS for implementation.
Alice can increase the length of chains or param-
eter 𝑘𝐴. For instance she can works with chains
𝐶1, 𝐶2, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝑋 and 𝑌 of length 𝑂(𝑘𝑑) and take
𝑘𝐴 of cardinality 𝑂(𝑘𝑑). So she can generate inverse
𝑋𝐶𝑖𝑋
′ and 𝑋𝐶𝑖′𝑋 ′, 𝑌 𝜎𝑟(𝐶𝑖)𝑌 ′ and 𝑌 𝜎𝑟(𝐶𝑖)
′
𝑌 ′ in
time 𝑂 (𝑘𝑑+3) . For computation of 𝑌 𝜎𝑟(𝐺′)
𝑘𝐴𝑌 ′ Alice
need also 𝑂(𝑘𝑑+3) operations. To compute values of
𝜇 she need time 𝑂(𝑘4+𝑑). Notice that further steps of
algorithms takes same time as before.
So in case of 𝑑 = 8 Alice requires 𝑂(𝑘12) to set data
for Bob and decrypt his message.
REMARK.Plainspace is 𝐾𝑛 with 𝑛 = 𝑘(𝑘+1). So in
above case Alice and Bob need time 𝑂(𝑛6) and 𝑂(𝑛7).
7. Quotients of semigroup Ch(𝐾, 𝑘), and in-
verse protocols
Let 𝐶 = (𝑃 1, 𝑃 2, . . . , 𝑃 𝑠) be a chain from 𝐶ℎ′(2𝑘,𝐾),
deg(𝑃 𝑠) = 1. We divide variables into two groups
𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘 and (𝑥𝑘+1, 𝑥𝑘+2, . . . , 𝑥2𝑘) and brake each
𝑃 𝑖 = (𝑃 𝑖1, 𝑃
𝑖
2, . . . , 𝑃
𝑖
2𝑘) into 𝑈 𝑖 = (𝑃 𝑖1, 𝑃 𝑖2, . . . , 𝑃 𝑖𝑘)
and 𝑊 𝑖 = (𝑃 𝑖𝑘+1, 𝑃 𝑖𝑘+2, . . . , 𝑃 𝑖2𝑘). We assume
that 𝑈 𝑖 maps (𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘) onto 𝑈 𝑖 and 𝑊 𝑖 maps
(𝑥𝑘+1, 𝑥𝑘+2, . . . , 𝑥2𝑘) onto 𝑊 𝑖. It is convenient to
use pair (𝑈0,𝑊 0) where 𝑈0 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘) and
𝑊 0 = (𝑥𝑘+1, 𝑥𝑘+2, . . . , 𝑥2𝑘).
We define deg′(𝐶) as maximum of deg(𝑈0)+deg(𝑊 0),
deg(𝑊 0) + deg(𝑈1), deg(𝑈1) + deg(𝑊 1), deg(𝑊 1) +
deg(𝑈2), . . . , deg(𝑊 𝑠−1) + deg(𝑈𝑠).
Let us consider symbolic flag of incidence
structure 𝐷𝑆(𝑘,𝐾) which consist of point
(x) = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘, 𝑥1,1, 𝑥1,2, . . . 𝑥𝑘,𝑘) with
colour (𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑘) and neighbouring line
[y] = [𝑦1, 𝑦2, . . . , 𝑦𝑘, 𝑦1,1, 𝑦1,2, . . . 𝑦𝑘,𝑘] with colour
(𝑦1, 𝑦2, . . . , 𝑦𝑘) = (𝑥𝑘+1, 𝑥𝑘+2, . . . , 𝑥2𝑘). We assume
that information of the flag is given by
(x) and colour tuple (𝑦1, 𝑦2, . . . , 𝑦𝑘), other coordinates
𝑦1,1, 𝑦1,2, . . . 𝑦𝑘,𝑘 of the line are recomputed as symbolic
expressions from the incidence condition.
We assume that a pair (𝑈0,𝑊 0) is a colour of
the symbolic flag. We consider a symbolic chain
in 𝐷𝑆(𝑘,𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥2𝑘]) of kind (x𝑖), [y]𝑖, 𝑖 =
0, 1, . . . , 𝑠 where (x0) = (x) is starting point of the
initial flag, [y]0 = [y] is a line of the flag, [y]𝑖𝐼(x𝑖+1)
for 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑠− 1 and [y]𝑖𝐼(x)𝑖 for 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑠,
symbolic colours of (x)𝑖 and [y]𝑖 are (𝑈 𝑖1, 𝑈 𝑖2, . . . , 𝑈 𝑖𝑘)
and (𝑊 𝑖1,𝑊 𝑖2, . . . ,𝑊 𝑖𝑘) respectively. Let us con-
sider a tuple of symbolic colours (𝑃 1, 𝑃 2, . . . , 𝑃 𝑠) ∈
𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥2𝑘]
2𝑘 and the map 𝐹 of the flag variety
of 𝐷𝑆(𝑘,𝐾) to itself which sends the initial flag given
by point (x) and colour of the neighbouring line to
the last flag given by point (x)𝑠 and colour 𝑊 𝑠 of the
last line in the chain. As it follows from definitions
𝐹 = 𝐹𝑃 1,𝑃 2,...,𝑃 𝑠 is a multivariate map of 𝐾(𝑘+1)
2
to
itself. When symbolic chain 𝐶 is given 𝐹 can be com-
puted in a standard form via elementary operations
of addition subtraction and multiplication of the ring
𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥2𝑘, 𝑥11, 𝑥12, . . . , 𝑥𝑘𝑘]. From the explicit
construction of the map 𝐹 the following statements
follows.
THEOREM 3
The map 𝜆 = 𝜆𝑘 which sends 𝑃 1, 𝑃 2, . . . , 𝑃 𝑠 to 𝐹 =





deg(𝜆(𝐶)) = deg′(𝐶) for 𝐶 from 𝑆𝑐ℎ′(2𝑘,𝐾)
LEMMA 9
An element 𝜆(𝐶) for 𝐶 = (𝑃 1, 𝑃 2, . . . , 𝑃 𝑠) is a
bijection iff the map 𝑃 𝑠 is one to one correspondence.
LEMMA 10
If 𝐹 is the inverse map for 𝑃 𝑠 in 𝑆(𝐾2𝑘) then for
𝐶 ′ given by tuple (𝐹 ×𝑃 𝑠−1, 𝐹 ×𝑃 𝑠−2, . . . , 𝐹 ×𝑃 1, 𝐹 )
the transformation 𝜆(𝐶 × 𝐶 ′) is an identity map.
We refer to 𝐶 ′ as reverse chain.
We consider the totality 𝑆𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(2𝑘,𝐾) of all chains
from 𝑆𝑐ℎ′(2𝑘,𝐾) of for which deg′ ≤ 𝑑, 𝑑 ≥ 2. This
subset is closed under the operation ×.
LEMMA 11.
On desynchronised multivariate algorithms of El Gamal type for stable semigroups of affine ...
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Subsemigroup 𝑆𝑒(𝑑, 𝑘) = 𝜆(𝑆𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(2𝑘,𝐾)) is a sta-
ble subsemigroup of 𝑆(𝐾(𝑘+1)
2
) of degree 𝑑, i. e. the de-
gree of each element of 𝑆𝑒(𝑑, 𝑘)) is ≤ 𝑑. Let us consider
totality 𝑆𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(𝑟, 2𝑘,𝐾), 1 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑘 of chains 𝐶 =
(𝑃 1, 𝑃 2, . . . , 𝑃 𝑠) from 𝐶ℎ′(𝑑)(2𝑘,𝐾) such that 𝑈 𝑖 =
(𝑃 𝑖1, 𝑃
𝑖
2, . . . , 𝑃
𝑖
𝑘) and 𝑊 𝑖 = (𝑃 𝑖𝑘+1, 𝑃 𝑖𝑘+2, . . . , 𝑃 𝑖2𝑘).
are tuples of kind 𝐹 𝑖 such that 𝐹 𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝐾[𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝑟]
for 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑟 and arbitrary 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑠.
LEMMA 12.
There is a canonical homomorphism 𝛿𝑟 of
𝑆𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(𝑟, 2𝑘,𝐾) onto 𝑆𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(𝑟,𝐾) sending
(𝐹 1, 𝐹 2, . . . , 𝐹 𝑡) into (𝐺1, 𝐺2, . . . , 𝐺𝑡), where 𝐺𝑖
is a projection of 𝐹 𝑖 onto its first 𝑟 coordinates.
LEMMA 13.
Let 𝜂 be natural embedding of 𝑆𝑐ℎ′(𝑑)(𝑟, 2𝑘,𝐾)
into 𝑆𝑐ℎ(𝑑)(2𝑘,𝐾). Then there is a homo-
morphism 𝜙 of 𝑆𝑒(𝑑, 𝑘) onto 𝑆𝑒(𝑑, 𝑟) such that
𝜙(𝜆𝑘(𝜂(𝐸𝑐ℎ
′(𝑑)(𝑟, 𝑘,𝐾))) = 𝜆𝑟(𝛿𝑟(𝑆𝑐ℎ
′(𝑑)(𝑟, 2𝑘,𝐾)).
Let 𝑒1, 𝑒2, . . . , 𝑒𝑘, 𝑒𝑘+1, 𝑒𝑘+2, . . . , 𝑒2𝑘, 𝑒11, 𝑒1,2, . . . , 𝑒𝑘,𝑘
be natural basis in which flag variety of graph
𝐷𝑆(𝑘,𝐾) is presented. For each symbolic walk
𝐺 transformation 𝜆(𝐺) preserves affine space 𝑊
spanned by 𝑒1, 𝑒2, . . . , 𝑒𝑟, 𝑒𝑘+1, 𝑒𝑘+2, . . . , 𝑒𝑘+𝑟 and 𝑒𝑖𝑗 ,
𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑟, 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑟. The homomorphism
𝜙 = 𝜙𝑟 is simply restriction of 𝜇(𝐺) onto 𝑊 .
IMPLEMENTED INVERSE TAHOMA ALGO-
RITHM.
Alice selects commutative ring 𝐾 and parameters 𝑘
and 𝑟.
Alice takes invertible chains 𝐶1, 𝐶2, . . . , 𝐶𝑚 from
𝐶ℎ′(2)(𝑟, 𝑘,𝐾) such that 𝐷𝑖 = 𝛿𝑟(𝐶𝑖) are inverible.
She also takes reverse chains 𝐷′𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . ,𝑚.
She takes invertible computations 𝐶 in 𝐶ℎ′(2)(𝑘,𝐾)
and 𝐷 in 𝐶ℎ′(2)(𝑟,𝐾) together with their reverses
𝐶 ′ and 𝐷′. Alice takes elements 𝑋, 𝑋−1 from
𝐴𝐺𝐿𝑘(𝑘+1)(𝐾) and 𝑌, 𝑌 −1 from 𝐴𝐺𝐿𝑟(𝑟+1)(𝐾). She
computes pairs of elements 𝑎𝑖−1 = 𝑌 𝜆𝑟(𝐷(𝐷′𝑖)𝐷′)𝑌 −1
and 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑋𝜆𝑘(𝐶(𝐶𝑖)𝐶 ′)𝑋−1. Alice sends pairs (𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖)
, to Bob.
Bob takes integer parameters 𝑟𝑖1 , 𝑟𝑖2 , . . . , 𝑟𝑖𝑠 . He
forms word 𝑎 as 𝑎𝑖1𝑟𝑖1𝑎𝑖2𝑟𝑖2 . . . 𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑖𝑠 and keeps it. Bob
creates 𝑧 = 𝑏𝑖𝑠
𝑟𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑖𝑠−1
𝑟𝑖𝑠−1 . . . 𝑏𝑖1
𝑟𝑖1 and sends it to
Alice.
RESTORATION. Alice computes 𝑧1 =
𝜇𝑘(𝐶
′)𝑋−1𝑧𝑋𝜇𝑘(𝐶). She takes 𝑧2 =
𝑌 𝜆𝑟(𝐷)(𝜙(𝑧1))𝜆𝑟(𝐷
′)𝑌 −1.
It is easy to see that the complexity estimates are
similar to case of El Gamal type algorithm from previous
section. CONCLUSION.
Conclusion
Presented key exchange protocols and cryptosystems
are based on graphs 𝐷𝑆(𝑘,𝐾), their properties depends
on the choice of commutative ring 𝐾. Their security
rest on the complexity of word decomposition problem
for the element of Cremona semigroup 𝑆(𝐾𝑛) into given
generators. Under assumption that the element and
generators are given by their standard forms of multi-
variate map the polynomial algorithm to solve it is not
known. As always search for appropriate cryptoanalysis
is important. We hope that method will attract atten-
tion of specialists. Other practical task is evaluation of
parameters for which resistance of algorithm will reach
standard level of security (for example 128 or 256 bites)
in case of commutative rings 𝑍27 , 𝑍28 ,𝑍216 , 𝑍232 , 𝐹27 ,
𝐹28 ,𝐹216 , 𝐹232 ,
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